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Abstract. Providing compact and understandable counterexamples for violated system
properties is an essential task in model checking. Existing works on counterexamples for
probabilistic systems so far computed either a large set of system runs or a subset of the
system’s states, both of which are of limited use in manual debugging. Many probabilistic
systems are described in a guarded command language like the one used by the popular
model checker PRISM. In this paper we describe how a smallest possible subset of the
commands can be identified which together make the system erroneous. We additionally
show how the selected commands can be further simplified to obtain a well-understandable
counterexample.
1. Introduction
One of the main strengths—perhaps the key feature—of model checking is its possibility
to automatically generate a counterexample in case a model refutes a given property [1].
Counterexamples provide essential diagnostic information for debugging purposes. They
also play an important role in counterexample-guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) [2],
a successful technique in software verification. In this iterative abstraction-refinement pro-
cess, abstractions that are too coarse are refined with the help of counterexamples. Sin-
gle system runs—typically acquired during model checking—suffice as counterexamples for
linear-time properties. For branching-time logics such as CTL and CTL∗, more general
shapes are necessary, such as tree-like counterexamples [3].
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This paper focuses on counterexamples for probabilistic automata [4], shortly labeled
transition systems in which transitions yield distributions over states (rather than just
states). A violating behavior in this setting entails that the (maximal) probability that a
certain property ϕ holds, such as a deadlock state is reachable, is outside of some required
bounds. For probabilistic reachability properties, it suffices to treat violations of upper
bounds [5]. Counterexamples consist of a finite set of finite runs that all satisfy the prop-
erty ϕ while their combined probability mass exceeds the required upper bound. In contrast
to some traditional model checking algorithms for LTL and CTL, probabilistic counterex-
amples are not obtained as a by-product of the verification process. Instead, dedicated
counterexample generation algorithms are used.
In the last years, several approaches have been proposed for probabilistic counterexam-
ple generation. Enumerative approaches [6, 5, 7] generate a set of finite paths based on k
shortest path algorithms possibly enhanced with heuristic search and/or SAT-based tech-
niques. Such counterexamples can be succinctly represented by, e. g., regular expressions [5]
or in a hierarchical manner [8, 9] using a graph decomposition of the Markov chain into
strongly connected components. An alternative is to use so-called critical sub-systems [6, 9].
The key idea of this approach is to obtain a—preferably small—connected fragment of the
Markov chain that itself already violates the property at hand. This sub-system can thus
be viewed as another representation of the set of runs that all satisfy the property ϕ whose
probability mass exceeds the required upper bound. In [10, 11] we suggested to obtain min-
imal critical sub-systems. Here, minimality refers to the state space size of the sub-Markov
chain. Whereas [6, 9] use heuristic approaches to construct small (but not necessarily
minimal) critical sub-systems, [10, 11] advocates the use of mixed integer linear program-
ming (MILP) [12]. The MILP-approach is applicable to ω-regular properties (that include
reachability) for both Markov chains and Markov decision processes (MDPs) [11], which
are a slightly variant of probabilistic automata.1 A more detailed overview of probabilistic
counterexamples is given in [13].
Despite the algorithmic differences, all counterexample generation algorithms published
so far have one thing in common—they are all state based. This means that path-based
approaches yield paths in the Markov model, whereas the critical sub-system techniques
obtain fragments of the Markov model. They do not obtain diagnostic information in terms
of the modeling formalism in which these models are described. This seriously hampers the
comprehensibility of counterexamples and is a significant obstacle in debugging the system
model (description). In addition, as most practical systems consist of various components
running concurrently, counterexamples in terms of the underlying (potentially huge) state
space are often too large to be used effectively. Although critical sub-systems often are
orders of magnitude smaller than the original system, they may still be very large, rendering
manual debugging practically impossible.
To overcome these deficiencies, this paper focuses on obtaining counterexamples at
the level of the modeling formalism. The basic idea is to determine a minimal critical
model description that acts as a counterexample—preferably in a fully automated manner.
Intuitively speaking, our approach determines the fragments of the model description that
are relevant for the violation of the property at hand. Having a human-readable specification
language, it seems natural that a user should be pointed to the part of the system description
1Obtaining minimal critical sub-systems for MDPs is NP-complete [6], as is solving MILP problems.
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which causes the error. This is exactly what our approach for high-level counterexamples
attempts to accomplish.
We assume Markov models are described using a stochastic version of Alur and Hen-
zinger’s reactive modules [14]. This is the modeling formalism adopted by the popular
probabilistic model checker PRISM [15]. In this setting, a probabilistic automaton [4] model
is typically specified as a parallel composition of modules. The behavior of a single module
is described using a probabilistic extension [16] of Dijkstra’s guarded command language [17].
Modules communicate by shared variables or synchronization on common actions. Our ap-
proach however is also applicable to other modeling formalisms for probabilistic automata
such as the process algebraic approach in [18] by using the similarities between linearised
process descriptions and the guarded command language.
This paper considers the problem of determining a—preferably small—set of guarded
commands that together induce a critical sub-system. In order to correct the system de-
scription, at least one of the returned guarded commands has to be changed. We show
how to simplify the commands by removing command branches which are not necessary to
obtain a counterexample. We present this as a special case of a method where the number
of different transition labels for a probabilistic automaton is minimized. This offers great
flexibility in terms of human-readable counterexamples. We show that obtaining a minimal
command set that acts as a counterexample is NP-complete and advocate the usage of MILP
techniques to obtain such a smallest critical label set. Besides the theoretical principles of
our technique, we illustrate its practical feasibility by showing the results of applying a
prototypical implementation to various examples from the PRISM benchmark suite.
Structure of the paper. The first section briefly reviews the necessary foundations. Section 3
presents the theoretical framework to obtain minimal counterexamples. Section 3.6 intro-
duces several simplification steps for reactive modules. After presenting some experimental
results in Section 4, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
This paper is an extended version of [19]. The extensions include (1) a more general labeling
(branches instead of transitions) enabling more simplification steps, (2) minimization of
variable values and intervals, and (3) detailed correctness proofs for the MILP formulation.
2. Foundations
Let S be a countable set. A sub-distribution on S is a function µ : S → [0, 1] ⊆ Q
such that 0 <
∑
s∈S µ(s) ≤ 1 with support supp(µ) = {s ∈ S |µ(s) > 0}. We use the
notation µ(S′) =
∑
s∈S′ µ(s) for S
′ ⊆ S. A sub-distribution with µ(S) = 1 is called a
probability distribution. We denote the set of all probability distributions on S by Distr(S)
and analogously the set of sub-distributions by SubDistr(S).
2.1. Probabilistic Automata.
Definition 2.1 (Probabilistic automaton). A probabilistic automaton (PA) is a tupleM =
(S, sinit,Act, P ) such that S is a finite set of states, sinit ∈ S is an initial state, Act is a
finite set of actions, and P : S → (2Act×Distr(S) \ {∅}) is a probabilistic transition relation
such that P (s) is finite for all s ∈ S.
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For notational convenience, we use all notations defined for (sub-)distributions also for
action-distribution pairs with the natural meaning, e. g., supp(η) = supp(µ) and η(s) = µ(s)
for η = (α, µ) ∈ Act ×Distr(S). We call η ∈ P (s) a transition, while a tuple (s, η, s′) with
η ∈ P (s) and η(s′) > 0 is called a branch of the transition.
For a state s ∈ S, a successor state is determined as follows: A transition η ∈ P (s) is
chosen non-deterministically. Then, s′ ∈ supp(η) is determined probabilistically according
to the distribution in η. This process can be repeated infinitely often starting with the
initial state sinit. To prevent deadlocks we assume P (s) 6= ∅ for all s ∈ S.
An infinite path of a PAM is an infinite sequence s0η0s1η1s2 . . . with si ∈ S, ηi ∈ P (si)
and si+1 ∈ supp(ηi) for all i ≥ 0. A finite path π of M is a finite prefix s0η0s1η1 . . . sn of
an infinite path of M with last(π) = sn. The set of all finite paths of M is PathsfinM.
A sub-PA is like a PA, but it allows sub-distributions instead of distributions in the
definition of P .
Definition 2.2 (Sub-PA). A sub-PA is a tupleM = (S, sinit,Act, P ) with S, sinit, and Act
as in Definition 2.1 and P : S → 2Act×SubDistr(S) is a probabilistic transition relation such
that P (s) is finite for all s ∈ S.
A sub-PA M = (S, sinit,Act, P ) can be transformed into a PA as follows: We add a
new state s⊥ 6∈ S and a new action τ /∈ Act, extend all sub-distributions into probability
distributions by defining µ(s⊥) = 1 − µ(S) for each s ∈ S and (α, µ) ∈ P (s), and set
P (s) = {(τ, µ) ∈ {τ}×Distr(S ∪{s⊥}) | µ(s⊥) = 1} for each s ∈ {s⊥}∪{s′ ∈ S |P (s′) = ∅}.
This allows for applying all methods we use for PAs also for sub-PAs.
Definition 2.3 (Subsystem). A sub-PAM′ = (S′, s′init,Act′, P ′) is a subsystem of a sub-PA
M = (S, sinit,Act, P ), written M′ ⊑M, iff S′ ⊆ S, s′init = sinit ∈ S′, Act′ ⊆ Act and for all
s ∈ S′ there is an injective function f : P ′(s)→ P (s) such that for all (α′, µ′) ∈ P ′(s) with
f((α′, µ′)) = (α, µ) we have that α′ = α and for all s′ ∈ S′ either µ′(s′) = 0 or µ′(s′) = µ(s′).
In this paper we are interested in probabilistic reachability properties: Is the probability
to reach a set T ⊆ S of target states from sinit at most a given bound λ ∈ [0, 1] ⊆ R? This
property is denoted by P≤λ(♦T ). Note that checking arbitrary ω-regular properties can
be reduced to checking reachability properties, see [20, Chapter 10.3]. To define a suitable
probability measure on PAs, the nondeterminism has to be resolved. This is done by an
oracle called scheduler.
Definition 2.4 (Scheduler). A memoryless deterministic scheduler2 for a sub-PA M =
(S, sinit, Act, P ) is a partial function σ : S 7→ Act × SubDistr(S) with σ(s) ∈ P (s) for all
s ∈ dom(σ). We use SchedM to denote the set of all memoryless deterministic schedulers
of M. Sched+M ⊆ SchedM is the set of all schedulers that are total functions σ : S →
Act× SubDistr(S). Such schedulers are called deadlock-free.
As a scheduler resolves the nondeterminism for a PA, this induces a fully probabilistic
model, for which a standard probability measure can be defined. We refer to [20, Chapter
10.1] for more details on schedulers and measure theory.
Definition 2.5 (Sub-PA induced by scheduler). For a sub-PAM = (S, sinit,Act, P ) and a
scheduler σ ∈ SchedM, the sub-PA induced byM and σ is given byMσ = (Sσ, sinit,Actσ, P σ)
2Note that schedulers in their full generality are functions mapping finite paths of the PA to distributions
over the outgoing transitions of each state. For unbounded probabilistic reachability properties memoryless
deterministic schedulers suffice to obtain maximal (and minimal) probabilities [20, Lemma 10.102].
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with Sσ = S, Actσ = {α ∈ Act | ∃s ∈ S.∃µ ∈ SubDistr(S). σ(s) = (α, µ)}, and
P σ(s) = {σ(s)} for all s ∈ dom(σ) and P σ(s) = ∅ for all s ∈ S \ dom(σ).
Note that inMσ, |P σ(s)| ≤ 1 holds for all s ∈ S. In fact, the actions could be removed,
which would yield a discrete-time Markov chain. For details, we again refer to [20].
For a sub-PA M with a fixed scheduler σ, the probability PrMσ(sinit,♦T ) can now
be computed by solving a linear equation system. The property P≤λ(♦T ) is satisfied by a
sub-PAM if PrMσ(sinit,♦T ) ≤ λ holds for all schedulers σ forM. To check this, it suffices
to compute the maximal probability to reach T from sinit over all schedulers, which we
denote by Pr+M(sinit,♦T ). This probability is given by the unique solution of the following
equation system:
Pr+M(s,♦T ) =


1 if s ∈ T,
0 if T is unreachable from s under all schedulers,
max
η∈P (s)
∑
s′∈S
η(s′) · Pr+M(s′,♦T ) otherwise.
(2.1)
It can be solved by either rewriting it into a linear program, by applying a technique called
value iteration, or by iterating over the possible schedulers (policy iteration) (see, e. g.,
[20, Chapter 10.6]). A memoryless deterministic scheduler can be obtained easily from the
solution of the equation system (cf. [20, Lemma 10.102]).
2.2. PRISM’s Guarded Command Language. For a set Var of bounded integer variables,
let AVar denote the set of all variable assignments, i. e., of functions ν : Var→ Z such that
ν(ξ) ∈ dom(ξ) for all ξ ∈ Var. We assume that the domains of all variables are finite.
Definition 2.6 (Model, module, command). A model is a tuple (Var, sinit, {M1, . . . ,Mk})
where Var is a finite set of Boolean variables, sinit ∈ AVar an initial assignment, and
{M1, . . . ,Mk} a finite set of modules.
A module is a tuple Mi = (Vari,Acti, Ci) with Vari ⊆ Var a set of variables such that
Vari ∩ Varj = ∅ for i 6= j, Acti a finite set of synchronizing actions, and Ci a finite set of
commands. The action τ with τ 6∈ ⋃ki=1Acti denotes the internal non-synchronizing action.
A command c ∈ Ci has the form
c = [α] g → p1 : f1 + . . .+ pn : fn
with α ∈ Acti ∪˙ {τ}, g a Boolean predicate (“guard”) over the variables in Var, pj ∈ [0, 1] a
rational number with
∑n
j=1 pj = 1, and fj : AVar → AVari being a variable update function.
We refer to the action α of command c by act(c).
Note that each module may only change the values of its own variables while their
new values may depend on variables of other modules. Each model with several modules
is equivalent to a model with a single module, which is obtained by computing the parallel
composition of these modules. We give a short intuition on how this composition is built.
For more details we refer to the documentation of PRISM.
Assume two modules M1 = (Var1,Act1, C1) and M2 = (Var2,Act2, C2) with Var1 ∩
Var2 = ∅. We first define the composition c⊗ c′ of two commands c and c′: For c = [α] g →
p1 : f1 + . . .+ pn : fn ∈ C1 and c′ = [α] g′ → p′1 : f ′1 + . . . + p′m : f ′m ∈ C2 we have:
c⊗ c′ = [α] g ∧ g′ →
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
pi · p′j : fi ⊗ f ′j .
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Here, for fi : AVar → AVar1 and f ′j : AVar → AVar2 we define fi ⊗ f ′j : AVar → AVar1∪Var2
such that for all ν ∈ AVar we have that (fi⊗ f ′j)(ν)(ξ) equals fi(ν)(ξ) for each ξ ∈ Var1 and
f ′j(ν)(ξ) for each ξ ∈ Var2.
Using this, the parallel composition M = M1 ‖M2 = (Var,Act, C) is given by Var =
Var1 ∪Var2, Act = Act1 ∪Act2, and
C = { c | c ∈ C1 ∪ C2 ∧ act(c) ∈ {τ} ∪ (Act1 \ Act2) ∪ (Act2 \Act1) } ∪
{ c⊗ c′| c ∈ C1 ∧ c′ ∈ C2 ∧ act(c) = act(c′) ∈ Act1 ∩Act2 } .
Intuitively, commands labeled with non-synchronizing actions are executed on their own,
while for synchronizing actions a command from each synchronizing module is executed
simultaneously. Note that if a module has an action in its synchronizing action set but
no commands labeled with this action, this module will block the execution of commands
with this action in the composition. This is considered to be a modeling error and the
corresponding commands are ignored.
The PA-semantics of a model is as follows. Assume a model (Var, sinit, {M}) with a
single moduleM = (Var,Act, C) which will not be subject to parallel composition any more
and Var = {ξ1, . . . , ξm}. The state space S of the corresponding PA M = (S, sinit,Act, P )
is given by the set of all possible variable assignments AVar, i. e., a state s is a vector
(v1, . . . , vm) with vi being a value of the variable ξi ∈ Var. To construct the transitions, we
observe that the guard g of each command
c = [α] g → p1 : f1 + . . . + pn : fn ∈ C
defines a subset of the state space Sc ⊆ AVar with s ∈ Sc iff s satisfies g. For each state
s ∈ Sc we define a probability distribution µc,s : AVar → [0, 1] with
µc,s(s
′) =
∑
{1≤i≤n|fi(s)=s′}
pi
for each s′ ∈ AVar. The probabilistic transition relation P : AVar → 2Act×Distr(AVar) is given
by P (s) = {(α, µc,s) | c ∈ C ∧ act(c) = α ∧ s ∈ Sc} for all s ∈ AVar.
Example 2.7. We consider the shared coin protocol of a randomized consensus algo-
rithm [21]. The protocol returns a preference between two choices with a certain probability.
A shared integer variable3 c is incremented or decremented by each process depending on
the internal result of a coin flipping. If the value of c becomes lower than a threshold left
or higher than a threshold right, the result is heads or tails, respectively.
The protocol, which is the same for each participating process, has the following local
variables: coin which is either 0 or 1, flip which is true iff the coin shall be flipped,
flipped which is true iff the coin has already been flipped, check which is true iff the
value of c shall be checked. Initially, c has a value between left and right, flip is true,
and flipped and check are false. Consider a simplified version of the original PRISM code:
3Our simplified definition of a model does not support variables which are written by more than one
module. The language actually implemented by PRISM, however, allows such variables with the restriction
that they may be written only by non-synchronizing commands in order to avoid writing conflicts.
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[τ ] flip → 0.5 : coin=0& flip=false& flipped=true
+ 0.5 : coin=1& flip=false& flipped=true (2.2)
[τ ] flipped& coin=0& c≤right → 1 : c=c-1& flipped=false& check=true (2.3)
[τ ] flipped& coin=1& left≤c → 1 : c=c+1& flipped=false& check=true (2.4)
[τ ] c<left → 1 : heads=true (2.5)
[τ ] c>right → 1 : tails=true (2.6)
[τ ] check& c≤right& c≥left → 1 : check=false& flip=true (2.7)
Command 2.2 sets coin to 0 or 1, each with probability 0.5. Commands 2.3 and 2.4
increment or decrement the shared counter c depending on the value of coin. Commands 2.5
and 2.6 check whether the value of c is above or below the boundaries left and right and
return heads or tails, respectively. If no boundary is violated, Command 2.7 sets flip to
true which enables Command 2.2 again.
2.3. Mixed Integer Programming. A mixed integer linear program optimizes a linear
objective function under a condition specified by a conjunction of linear inequalities. A
subset of the variables in the inequalities is restricted to take only integer values, which
makes solving MILPs NP-hard [22, Problem MP1].
Definition 2.8 (Mixed integer linear program). Let A ∈ Qm×n, B ∈ Qm×k, b ∈ Qm, c ∈ Qn,
and d ∈ Qk. A mixed integer linear program (MILP) consists in computing min cTx+ dT y
such that Ax+By ≤ b and x ∈ Rn, y ∈ Zk.
MILPs are typically solved by a combination of a branch-and-bound algorithm and the
generation of so-called cutting planes. These algorithms heavily rely on the fact that relax-
ations of MILPs which result from removing the integrality constraints can be efficiently
solved. MILPs are widely used in operations research, hardware-software co-design, and nu-
merous other applications. Efficient open source as well as commercial implementations are
available like Scip [23], and Gurobi [24]. We refer to the textbook [12] for more information
on solving MILPs.
3. Computing Counterexamples
In this section we show how to compute a smallest critical command set of a given model,
i. e.,, a smallest subset of the model’s commands which lead to an erroneous system inde-
pendent of the other commands. For this, we introduce a generalization of this problem,
namely smallest critical label sets, state the complexity, and specify an MILP formulation
to solve this problem.
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3.1. Smallest Critical Label Sets. LetM = (S, sinit,Act, P ) be a PA, T ⊆ S, and Lab a
finite set of labels. Assume furthermore a partial labeling function L : S×Act×Distr(S)×
S 7→ 2Lab such that L(s, η, s′) is defined iff η ∈ P (s) and s′ ∈ supp(η).
Let Lab′ ⊆ Lab be a subset of the labels. The sub-PA induced by Lab′ is M|Lab′ =
(S, sinit,Act, P|Lab′) such that for all s ∈ S we have
P|Lab′(s) = {(α, µ|Lab′) | (α, µ) ∈ P (s) ∧ ∃s′ ∈ S.L(s, α, µ, s′) ⊆ Lab′} ,
where µ|Lab′ ∈ SubDistr(S) with µ|Lab′(s′) = µ(s′) if L(s, α, µ, s′) ⊆ Lab′ and µ|Lab′(s′) = 0
otherwise for each s′ ∈ S. Thus in M|Lab′ all branches have been removed whose labeling
is not a subset of Lab′.
Definition 3.1 (Smallest critical label set (SCL) problem). Let M, T , Lab, and L be
defined as above and P≤λ(♦T ) be a reachability property that is violated by sinit in M. A
label set Lab′ ⊆ Lab and its induced sub-PA M|Lab′ = (S, sinit,Act, P ′) are called critical
if Pr+M|Lab′
(sinit,♦T ) > λ.
Given a weight function w : Lab → R≥0, the smallest critical label set (SCL) problem
is to determine a critical subset Lab′ ⊆ Lab such that w(Lab′) = ∑ℓ∈Lab′ w(ℓ) is minimal
among all critical subsets of Lab.
Theorem 3.2. To decide whether there is a critical label set Lab′ ⊆ Lab with w(Lab′) ≤ k
for a given integer k ≥ 0 is NP-complete.
The proof of this theorem is a reduction from exact 3-cover (X3C) [22], similar to a proof
in [25]. For the aid of the reviewers, we give the proof in Appendix A.
The concept of smallest critical label sets gives us a flexible description of counterex-
amples being minimal with respect to different quantities. We will now list different kinds
of counterexamples that can be computed using an SCL.
Commands. In order to minimize the number of commands that together induce an erro-
neous system, i. e., form a critical command set, letM = (S, sinit,Act, P ) be a PA generated
by modules Mi = (Vari,Acti, Ci), i = 1, . . ., k. For each module Mi and each command
c ∈ Ci we introduce a unique label4 ℓc,i with weight 1 and define the labeling function
L : S×Act×Distr(S)×S 7→ 2Lab such that the labels in L(s, η, s′) correspond to the set of
commands which together generate this transition η ∈ P (s).5 Note that in case of synchro-
nization several commands together create a certain transition. An SCL then corresponds
to a smallest critical command set.
Modules. We can also minimize the number of modules involved in a counterexample by
using the same label for all commands in a module. Often systems consist of a number of
copies of the same module, containing the same commands, only with the local variables
renamed, plus a few extra modules. Consider for example a wireless network: n nodes want
to transmit messages using a protocol for medium access control [26]. All nodes run the
same protocol. Additionally, there may be a module describing the channel. When fixing an
erroneous system, one wants to preserve the identical structure of the nodes. Therefore the
selected commands should contain the same subset of commands from all identical modules.
4In the following we write short ℓc instead of ℓc,i if the index i is clear from the context.
5If several command sets generate the same transition, we introduce copies of the transition.
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This can be obtained by assigning the same label to all corresponding commands from the
symmetric modules and using the number of symmetric modules as its weight.
Deletion of unnecessary branches. The SCL problem can also be used to simplify
commands. For this we identify a smallest set of command branches that need to be
preserved, such that the induced sub-PA still violates the property under consideration.
The resulting command branches can be removed, still yielding an erroneous system. Given
a command ci of the form [α] g → p1 : f1+p2 : f2+ · · ·+pn : fn, we assign to each command
branch pj : fj a unique label ℓi,j with weight 1. Let Lab be the set of all such labels.
When the parallel composition of modules is computed, see Section 2.2, we build the union
of the labelings of the synchronizing command branches being executed together. When
computing the corresponding PA M, we transfer this labeling to the transition branches of
M: We define the labeling function L such that L(s, η, s′) contains the labels of all command
branches that are involved in generating the branch from s to s′ via the transition η.
States. The state-minimal critical subsystems as introduced in [10] can be also obtained
as special case of smallest critical label sets: For each state s ∈ S introduce a label ℓs with
weight 1 and set L(s, η, s′) = {ℓs′} for all s ∈ S, η ∈ P (s) and s′ ∈ supp(η). Then a smallest
critical label set Lab′ ⊆ Lab = {ℓs | s ∈ S} induces a state-minimal critical subsystem.
Variable domains. Smallest critical label sets can also be used to reduce the domains of
the variables in the PRISM program. Let Var be the set of variables of a PRISM program
and M = (S, sinit,Act, P ) the corresponding PA. Note that each state s ∈ S corresponds
to an assignment of the variables in Var. For a variable ξ ∈ Var we denote by s(ξ) the
value of ξ in state s. Let Lab = {ℓξ,v | ξ ∈ Var ∧ v ∈ dom(ξ)} be the set of labels, each with
weight 1. We define the labeling of transition branches by corresponding variable values
as L(s, η, s′) = {ℓξ,v | ξ ∈ Var ∧ s′(ξ) = v}. A smallest critical labeling induces a critical
subsystem with a minimum number of variable values. If we restrict the variable domains
to these values, we still obtain an erroneous system.
Variable intervals. The previous reduction technique removes a maximum number of
values from the variables’ domains. Originally the domains are intervals in Z. Minimization,
however, yields sets that are in general not intervals anymore. We can also minimize the
size of the intervals instead. To do so we need to impose further constraints on the valid
label sets Lab′. Details will be presented in Section 3.7.
Remark 3.3. The various applications require label sets of very different sizes. For the
minimization of commands, modules, and branches the number of labels is linear in the size
of the model description. In contrast, the number of different labels for state minimization
is linear in the number of (reachable) states of the described PA, which can be exponential
in the size of its description. The same holds for the minimization of variable domains and
intervals.
3.2. Computing Smallest Critical Label Sets. We now explain how smallest critical
label sets can be computed. First, the notions of relevant and problematic states are intro-
duced. Intuitively, state s is relevant if it is on a path from the initial state to a target state.
A relevant state s is problematic, if there exists a deadlock-free scheduler under which no
target state is reachable from s.
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sinit s1
t
α
1.0
α
1.0
β β
Figure 1: Example for problematic states
Definition 3.4 (Relevant and problematic states and transitions). Let M, T , and L be
as above. The relevant states of M for T are given by SrelT = {s ∈ S | ∃σ ∈ SchedM.
PrσM(sinit,♦ {s}) > 0 ∧ PrσM(s,♦T ) > 0}. A label ℓ is relevant for T if there are s ∈ SrelT ,
η ∈ P (s), and s′ ∈ supp(η) ∩ SrelT such that ℓ ∈ L(s, η, s′).
The states in SprobT = {s ∈ SrelT | ∃σ ∈ Sched+M.PrσM(s,♦T ) = 0} are problematic states
and the set P probT =
{
(s, η) ∈ SprobT × Act × Distr(S)
∣∣ η ∈ P (s) ∧ supp(η) ⊆ SprobT } are
problematic state-transition-pairs regarding T .
States that are not relevant can be removed from the PA together with all their incident
branches without changing the probability of reaching T from sinit. Additionally, all labels
that do not occur in the relevant part of the PA can be deleted. We therefore assume
that the (sub-)PA under consideration contains only states and labels that are relevant for
T . Note that the relevant states and labels can be computed in linear time using graph
algorithms [27]. In our computation, we need to ensure that from each problematic state a
non-problematic state is reachable under the selected scheduler, otherwise the probability
of problematic states is not well-defined by the constraints as in [28].
Example 3.5. The PA in Figure 1 illustrates the issues with problematic states. Assume t
is a target state. States sinit and s1 are both problematic since the scheduler which selects
α in both sinit and s1 prevents reaching a target state, but all other schedulers do not. We
cannot remove the outgoing transitions belonging to action α in a preprocessing step since a
scheduler may choose α in one state and β in the other one. However, if a scheduler chooses
α in both states, we obtain according to Equation (2.1) the following equation system for
model checking:
psinit = 1.0 · ps1 ps1 = 1.0 · psinit
For all κ ∈ [0, 1] we obtain a solution by setting psinit = ps1 = κ, although the target state
t is not reachable at all.
We solve this problem by attaching a value rs to each problematic state s ∈ SprobT and
encoding that a transition of s may be selected only if it has at least one successor state s′
with a value rs′ > rs attached to it. Since the sub-PA is finite, this requirement assures by
induction that there is a (loop-free) increasing path from s to a non-problematic or deadlock
state, along which the values attached to the states are strictly increasing. This implies
that the probability of each loop visiting problematic states only is always less than one.
To encode the computation of smallest critical label sets as MILP, we use the following
variables with values assigned as described:
• for each ℓ ∈ Lab a variable xℓ ∈ {0, 1} ⊆ Z which is 1 iff ℓ is part of the critical label set;
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• for each state s ∈ S \T and each transition η ∈ P (s) a variable σs,η ∈ {0, 1} ⊆ Z which is
1 iff η is chosen in s by the scheduler; the scheduler is free not to choose any transition;
• for each branch (s, η, s′) with s ∈ S, η ∈ P (s) and s′ ∈ supp(η) a variable ps,η,s′ ∈
[0, 1] ⊆ R which is 0 if not all labels in L(s, η, s′) are contained in Lab′, and at most η(s′)
otherwise;
• for each state s ∈ S a variable ps ∈ [0, 1] ⊆ R whose value is at most the probability to
reach a target state from s under the selected scheduler within the subsystem induced by
the selected label set;
• for each problematic state s ∈ S a variable rs ∈ [0, 1] ⊆ R for the encoding of increasing
paths; and
• for each problematic state-transition pair (s, η) ∈ P probT and each successor state s′ ∈
supp(η) a variable ts,η,s′ ∈ {0, 1} ⊆ Z, where ts,η,s′ = 1 implies that the values attached
to the states increase along the branch (s, η, s′), i. e., rs < rs′ .
Let wmin = min
{
w(ℓ) | ℓ ∈ Lab ∧w(ℓ) > 0} be the smallest positive weight that is assigned
to any label. The MILP for the smallest critical label set problem is then as follows:
minimize − 1
2
wmin · psinit +
∑
ℓ∈Lab
w(ℓ) · xℓ (3.1a)
such that
psinit > λ (3.1b)
∀s ∈ T. ps = 1 (3.1c)
∀s ∈ S \ T.
∑
η∈P (s)
σs,η ≤ 1 (3.1d)
∀s ∈ S \ T. ps ≤
∑
η∈P (s)
σs,η (3.1e)
∀s ∈ S \ T.∀η ∈ P (s).∀s′ ∈ supp(η). ∀ℓ ∈ L(s, η, s′).
ps,η,s′ ≤ xℓ (3.1f)
∀s ∈ S \ T.∀η ∈ P (s).∀s′ ∈ supp(η). ps,η,s′ ≤ η(s′) · ps′ (3.1g)
∀s ∈ S \ T.∀η ∈ P (s). ps ≤ (1− σs,η) +
∑
s′∈supp(η)
ps,η,s′ (3.1h)
∀(s, η) ∈ P probT . σs,η =
∑
s′∈supp(η)
ts,η,s′ (3.1i)
∀(s, η) ∈ P probT .∀s′ ∈ supp(η). rs < rs′ + (1− ts,η,s′) (3.1j)
We first explain the constraints in lines (3.1b)–(3.1j) of the MILP, which describe a
critical label set. First, we ensure that the probability of the initial state exceeds the
probability bound λ (3.1b). The probability of target states is set to 1 (3.1c). For each
state s ∈ S \ T the scheduler selects at most one transition, encoded by setting at most
one scheduler variable σs,η ∈ P (s) to 1 (3.1d). Note that there may be states where no
transition is chosen. In this case the probability of a state is set to 0 (3.1e). The next two
constraints describe the probability contribution of an edge η ∈ P (s) from s to s′: If a label
ℓ ∈ L(s, η, s′) is not contained in the selected subset, the probability of the branch is set to
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0 (3.1f). Otherwise this constraint is satisfied for all possible values of ps,η,s′ ∈ [0, 1] ⊆ R.
Then the following constraint (3.1g) imposes an upper bound on the contribution of this
branch, namely the probability η(s′) of this branch times the probability of the successor
state s′. Constraint (3.1h) is trivially satisfied if σs,η = 0, i. e., if the scheduler does not
select the current transition. Otherwise the probability ps of state s is at most the sum of
the probabilities of its outgoing branches.
The reachability of at least one deadlocking or non-problematic state is ensured by
(3.1i) and (3.1j). First, if a problematic transition η of a state s is selected by the scheduler
then exactly one transition branch flag must be activated. Second, for all paths along
activated branches of problematic transitions, an increasing order on the problematic states
is enforced. Because of this order, no problematic states can be revisited on an increasing
path which enforces the final reachability of a non-problematic or a deadlocking state.
These constraints assure that each satisfying assignment of the label variables xℓ cor-
responds to a critical label set. By minimizing the total weight of the selected labels we
obtain a smallest critical label set. By the additional term −12wmin ·psinit we obtain not only
a smallest critical label set but one with maximal probability. The coefficient −12wmin is
needed to ensure that the benefit from maximizing the probability is smaller than the loss
by adding an additional label. Please note that any coefficient c with 0 < c < wmin could
be used.
3.3. Size of the MILP. The number of integer variables in this MILP is in O(l + m),
the number of real variables in O(n + m), and the number of constraints in O(n + l ·m)
where l = |Lab| is the number of labels, n = |S| the number of states, and m the number
of branches of PA M, i. e., m = ∣∣{(s, η, s′) | s ∈ S, η ∈ P (s), s′ ∈ supp(η)}∣∣.
Remark 3.6. In case the labeling L(s, η, s′) does not depend on the successor states s′,
but only on the state s and the selected transition η or even only on s, then constraints
(3.1f)–(3.1h) can be simplified. See [19] for details.
3.4. Correctness of the MILP. For the correctness of the MILP formulation (3.1a)–(3.1j)
we need to show that for each critical label set there is a satisfying assignment of the MILP
and that from each satisfying assignment of the MILP one can construct a critical label set.
As setting we have again M, T , L, Lab and M|Lab′ for Lab′ ⊆ Lab.
Lemma 3.7. For each critical label set Lab′ ⊆ Lab there is an assignment ν of the MILP
variables with ν(xℓ) = 1 iff ℓ ∈ Lab′ such that the constraints (3.1b)–(3.1j) are satisfied.
Proof. Let Lab′ ⊆ Lab be a critical label set. Then Pr+M|Lab′ (sinit,♦T ) > λ and a determinis-
tic memoryless scheduler σ forM|Lab′ exists with PrMσ|Lab′ (sinit,♦T ) = Pr
+
M|Lab′
(sinit,♦T ) >
λ and s ∈ dom(σ) iff Pr+M|Lab′ (s,♦T ) > 0, for all s ∈ S \ T . Let G = (V,E) be the digraph
with V = dom(σ) ∪ T and E = {(s, s′) ∈ V × V | s′ ∈ supp(σ(s))}. Now consider a smallest
(edge-minimal) subgraph G′ = (V,E′) of G containing for each state s ∈ V a path from s
to T . Due to minimality, G′ is loop-free and contains for each state s ∈ V \ T exactly one
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outgoing edge. We set
ν(xℓ) =
{
1 if ℓ ∈ Lab′,
0 otherwise;
ν(σs,η) =
{
1 if s ∈ dom(σ) and σ(s) = η,
0 otherwise;
ν(ps) = PrMσ
|Lab′
(s,♦T ); ν(ps,η,s′) =
{
η(s′) · ν(ps′) if L(s, η, s′) ⊆ Lab′,
0 otherwise;
ν(ts,η,s′) =
{
1 if s ∈ V ∩ SprobT and (s, s′) ∈ E′ and σ(s) = η,
0 otherwise;
ν(rs) =
{
1
2ν(rs′) if s ∈ V ∩ SprobT and(s, s′) ∈ E′,
1 otherwise.
We now systematically check the constraints (3.1b) through (3.1j):
(3.1b) is satisfied by ν because ν(psinit) = PrMσ|Lab′ (sinit,♦T ) > λ.
(3.1c) holds because PrMσ
|Lab′
(s,♦T ) = 1 for all target states s ∈ T .
(3.1d) holds since the deterministic memoryless scheduler σ selects at most one transition
in each state.
(3.1e) is trivially satisfied if ν(σs,η) = 1 for some η ∈ P (s). Otherwise, if no action is
chosen, s is a deadlock state and the probability ν(ps) to reach a target state is 0.
(3.1f) is satisfied as ν(ps,η,s′) is defined to be 0 if ℓ ∈ L(s, η, s′) for some ℓ 6∈ Lab′.
(3.1g) holds by the definition of ν(ps,η,s′).
(3.1h) is trivially satisfied if ν(σs,η) = 0. In case ν(σs,η) = 1, the constraint reduces to
ps ≤
∑
s′∈supp(η) ps,η,s′ ≤
∑
s′∈supp(η) η(s
′) · ps′ with η = σ(s). It is satisfied if
ν(ps) = 0. Otherwise, since ν(ps) is the reachability probability of T in Mσ|Lab′ , it
satisfies the following equation [20, Theorem 10.19]:
ν(ps) =
∑
s′∈supp(η)
η(s′) · ν(ps′) =
∑
s′∈supp(η)
ν(ps,η,s′).
M|Lab′ contains exactly those branches (s, η, s′) of Mσ for which L(s, η, s′) ⊆ Lab′
and therefore ν(ps,η,s′) = η(s
′) · ν(ps′). For all other branches (s, η, s′) in Mσ, but
not in Mσ
|Lab′
, ν(ps,η,s′) = 0 holds. Hence we have ν(ps) =
∑
s′∈supp(η) ν(ps,η,s′) and
(3.1h) is satisfied.
(3.1i) holds if ν(σs,η) = 0, since in this case by definition either s /∈ dom(σ) or η 6= σ(s)
and therefore ν(ts,η,s′) = 0 for all s
′ ∈ S. Otherwise ν(σs,η) = 1, i. e., σ(s) = η. By
the construction of G′ there is exactly one s′ ∈ supp(η) with ν(ts,η,s′) = 1.
(3.1j) is straightforward if ν(ts,η,s′) = 0. Otherwise by definition rs =
1
2rs′ , and since
ν(rs), ν(rs′) > 0, the inequality holds.
Lemma 3.8. Let ν be a satisfying assignment of the MILP (3.1b)–(3.1j). Then Lab′ =
{ℓ ∈ Lab | ν(xℓ) = 1} is a critical label set.
Proof. Let ν be a satisfying assignment and Lab′ = {ℓ ∈ Lab | ν(xℓ) = 1} the induced
label set. We define the scheduler σ : S 7→ Act × SubDistr(S) by dom(σ) = {s ∈ S | ∃η ∈
P (s). ν(σs,η) = 1 ∧ ∃s′ ∈ supp(η). L(s, η, s′) ⊆ Lab′} and for each s ∈ dom(σ) we set
σ(s) = η with ν(σs,η) = 1. Due to constraint (3.1d) there is at most one transition η ∈ P (s)
for σs,η = 1. Therefore the scheduler is well defined. If s /∈ dom(σ) then s is a deadlock
state under σ with no outgoing transition.
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Let σ|Lab′ : S 7→ Act×SubDistr(S) result from σ by removing branches whose labels are
not included in Lab′, i. e., dom(σ|Lab′) = dom(σ) and for each s ∈ dom(σ|Lab′) and s′ ∈ S,
σ|Lab′(s)(s
′) = σ(s)(s′) if L(s, σ(s), s′) ⊆ Lab′, and σ|Lab′(s)(s′) = 0 otherwise.
Let U be the set of states from which T is not reachable in Mσ
|Lab′
6, D the deadlock
states in U , and R the states in U whose scheduled transitions got reduced by removing
some branches due to the selected label set:
U = {s ∈ S |T is unreachable from s in Mσ|Lab′}
D = U \ dom(σ|Lab′)
R = {s ∈ U ∩ dom(σ|Lab′) |σ(s) 6= σ|Lab′(s)} .
The reachability probabilities qs = PrMσ
|Lab′
(s,♦T ) are the unique solution of the fol-
lowing linear equation system [20, Theorem 10.19]:
qs =


1 for s ∈ T ,
0 for s ∈ U ,∑
s′∈S σ|Lab′(s)(s
′) · qs′ otherwise.
(3.2)
This equation system is well defined, since, if σ|Lab′(s) is undefined, either s is a target state
or the target states are unreachable from s. In the following we prove
ν(ps) = 1 for s ∈ T , (3.3)
ν(ps) = 0 for s ∈ U , (3.4)
ν(ps) ≤ qs otherwise . (3.5)
Thus ν(ps) ≤ qs for each s ∈ S. With (3.1b) we get qsinit > λ, i. e., Lab′ is critical.
It remains to show that (3.3)–(3.5) hold.
(3.3) is straightforward for target states s ∈ T due to (3.1c).
(3.4) First we observe that from all states s ∈ U a state in D ∪ R is reachable: Equations
(3.1i) and (3.1j) assure that from each problematic state in U we can reach a state
from D∪R (proof by induction over the problematic states s ∈ SprobT with decreasing
values rs). From the non-problematic states in U the target states T are reachable
in M under each scheduler. Therefore, the unreachability of T from those states in
Mσ
|Lab′
is due to the selected label set, where certain branches on each path leading
to T are not available any more. Thus also from each non-problematic state in U we
can reach a state in D ∪R.
Now we show that ν(ps) = 0 for all s ∈ U . Assume the opposite and let s ∈ U
with ν(ps) = ξ
max = max{ν(ps′) | s′ ∈ U} > 0. Then s ∈ dom(σ|Lab′) by Equations
(3.1e)–(3.1h), and for σ|Lab′(s) = η we get:
ξmax = ν(ps) ≤
∑
s′∈supp(η)
η(s′) · ν(ps′) ≤
∑
s′∈supp(η)
η(s′) · ξmax
= ξmax ·
∑
s′∈supp(η)
η(s′) ≤ ξmax .
(3.6)
6Note that the order of operations is not arbitrary here. We have (Mσ)|Lab′ = (M|Lab′)
σ|Lab′ .
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Therefore all inequalities have to hold with equality. Since ξmax is assumed to be
positive, this is possible only if
∑
s′∈supp(η) η(s
′) = 1, i. e., s ∈ U \R, and ν(ps′) = ξmax
for all s′ ∈ supp(η). By induction we conclude that ν(ps′) = ξmax and s′ ∈ U \ R for
all states s′ that are reachable from s under σ|Lab′ . We know that from each s ∈ U
either a state s′ ∈ D or a state s′ ∈ R is reachable. For the former case s′ ∈ D,
from (3.1e)–(3.1h) we imply ν(ps′) = 0, contradicting to ν(ps′) = ξ
max > 0. In the
latter case s′ ∈ R, the definition of R implies ∑s′′∈supp(σ|Lab′ (s′)) σ|Lab′(s′)(s′′) < 1,
contradicting to
∑
s′′∈supp(σ|Lab′(s
′)) σ|Lab′(s
′)(s′′) = 1. Therefore our assumption was
wrong and we have proven ν(ps) = 0 for each s ∈ U .
(3.5) Finally we show that ν(ps) ≤ qs for each s ∈ S \(T ∪U). The constraints (3.1f)–(3.1h)
can be simplified for the chosen action σ|Lab′(s) = η to:
ps ≤
∑
s′∈supp(η)
η(s′) · ps′ (3.7)
Let νopt be a satisfying assignment such that νopt(ps) is maximal among all satisfying
assignments (this maximum exists, since the set of satisfying assignments is compact).
We claim that for all s′ ∈ S \ (T ∪ U) reachable from s in Mσ
|Lab′
, Equation (3.7)
is satisfied by νopt with equality. Assume the converse is true, i. e., there is a state
s′ ∈ S \ (T ∪ U) that is reachable from s in Mσ
|Lab′
such that σ|Lab′(s) = η and
0 < ε =
( ∑
s′′∈supp(η)
η(s′′) · νopt(ps′′)
)
− νopt(ps′) .
Let s = s0η0s1η1 . . . sn = s
′ be an acyclic path in Mσ
|Lab′
from s to s′. We could
increase the value νopt(psn) by at least εn = ε (more, if psn also appears on the
right-hand side; note that 0 ≤ ηi(si) < 1 holds for all i = 0, . . . , n). This would not
violate any inequality, since in the inequalities for the other states psn appears only in
upper bounds on the right-hand sides with a non-negative coefficient. Assume that,
for some i ≤ n, we have increased the value of si by εi. Then the right-hand side of
the inequality for si−1 increases by at least ηi−1(si) · εi > 0. Therefore we could also
increase the value of psi−1 by ηi−1(si) · εi. This could be continued along the path
back to s = s0, whose value could be increased by ε0 = ε ·
∏n−1
i=0 ηi(si+1) > 0. But
then νopt(ps) would not be optimal, contradicting our assumption ε > 0.
This means, the inequalities for all states that are reachable from s are satisfied
with equality for νopt, in other words, νopt encodes the solution νopt(ps) = qs to (3.2).
Since νopt is maximal for s, all other assignments satisfy ν(ps) ≤ qs.
Theorem 3.9. The MILP given in (3.1a)–(3.1j) yields a smallest critical label set.
Proof. According to Lemmas 3.7 and 3.8, for each critical label set Lab′ there is a satis-
fying assignment ν and vice versa. With Lab′ = {ℓ ∈ Lab | ν(xℓ) = 1} and w(Lab′) =∑
ℓ∈Lab′ w(ℓ) =
∑
ℓ∈Lab w(ℓ) · ν(xℓ), for the objective function
w(Lab′)− wmin < −1
2
wmin · ν(psinit) + w(Lab′) < w(Lab′)
holds. By minimizing the objective function, we obtain a smallest critical label set.
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3.5. Optimizations. The constraints of the MILP describe critical label sets, whereas min-
imality is enforced by the objective function. In this section we describe how some addi-
tional constraints can be imposed, which explicitly exclude variable assignments that are
either not optimal or encode label sets that are also encoded by other assignments. The
branch&bound methods used for solving MILPs [12] obtain lower bounds on the optimal
solution by solving a linear relaxation of the problem. The lower bounds are used to prune
branches of the search space which cannot contain an optimal solution. Adding constraints
that are redundant regarding the feasible solutions can improve the relaxation, yield larger
lower bounds and let the solver thus prune more branches of the search space. This can
reduce the computation time significantly in spite of the larger number of constraints.
Scheduler cuts. We want to exclude solutions of the constraint set for which a non-
deadlocking state s has only deadlocking successors under the selected scheduler. Note
that such solutions would define ps = 0. We add for all s ∈ S \ T and all η ∈ P (s) with
supp(η) ∩ T = ∅ the constraint
σs,η ≤
∑
s′∈supp(η)\{s}
∑
η′∈P (s′)
σs′,η′ . (3.8)
Analogously, we require for each non-initial state s with a selected action-distribution pair
η ∈ P (s) that there is a selected action-distribution pair leading to s. Thus, we add for all
states s ∈ S \ {sinit} the constraint∑
η∈P (s)
σs,η ≤
∑
s′∈{s′′∈S | s′′ 6=s∧∃η∈P (s′′). s∈supp(η)}
∑
η′∈{η′′∈P (s′) | s∈supp(η′′)}
σs′,η′ . (3.9)
As special cases of these cuts, we can encode that the initial state has at least one activated
outgoing transition and that at least one of the target states has a selected incoming tran-
sition. These special cuts come with very few additional constraints and often have a great
impact on the solution times.
Label cuts. In order to guide the solver to select the correct combinations of labels and
scheduler variables, we want to enforce that for every selected label ℓ there is at least one
scheduler variable σs,η activated such that ℓ ∈
⋃
s′∈supp(η) L(s, η, s
′):
xℓ ≤
∑
s∈S
∑
η∈{η′∈P (s) | ∃s′∈supp(η′). ℓ∈L(s,η′,s′)}
σs,η . (3.10)
Synchronization cuts. While scheduler and label cuts are applicable to the general small-
est critical label set problem, synchronization cuts take the proper synchronization of com-
mands into account and are applicable for the computation of smallest critical command
sets only.
Let Mi,Mj (i 6= j) be two modules which synchronize on action α, c a command of Mi
with action α, and Cj,α the set of commands with action α in module Mj. The following
constraint ensures that if command c is selected by activating the variable xlc then at least
one command d ∈ Cj,α is selected, too.
xℓc ≤
∑
d∈Cj,α
xℓd . (3.11)
Similar constraints can be formulated for minimization of command branches.
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3.6. Further Simplification of Counterexamples. Given a PAM as a PRISM program
and a violated reachability property P≤λ(♦T ), we propose to extract a counterexample as
follows:
(1) remove all commands which are not necessary for a violation of the property,
(2) remove all unnecessary branches of the remaining commands, and
(3) reduce the domains of the variables as much as possible.
These simplification steps are special cases of the SCL problem, as described in the previous
section. As an alternative to the last step, the intervals of the variables can be reduced,
which is also an application of the SCL problem, but with additional constraints.
3.7. Reduction of Variable Intervals. Using SCL to reduce variable domains as de-
scribed in Section 3.1 can yield domains that are not intervals anymore. If intervals are
desired, additional constraints are necessary to keep the domains connected.
For each variable ξ ∈ Var we encode an interval [lξ, uξ] ⊆ dom(ξ) ⊆ Z by introducing
two additional variables huξ,v, h
l
ξ,v ∈ {0, 1} ⊆ Z for each v ∈ dom(ξ). The intuition is that
huξ,v = 1 iff v > uξ, and h
l
ξ,v = 1 iff v < lξ. The remaining values v ∈ dom(ξ), for which
huξ,v = 0 and h
l
ξ,v = 0 hold, form the interval. We add the following additional constraints
to the MILP (3.1a)–(3.1j):
∀ξ ∈ Var.∀v ∈ dom(ξ). v 6= min(dom(ξ)). hlξ,v ≤ hlξ,v−1 (3.12a)
∀ξ ∈ Var.∀v ∈ dom(ξ). v 6= max(dom(ξ)). huξ,v ≤ huξ,v+1 (3.12b)
∀ξ ∈ Var.∀v ∈ dom(ξ). hlξ,v + huξ,v + xℓξ,v = 1 (3.12c)
The first constraint takes care that, if a value v is neglected (i. e., hlξ,v = 1), also the
value v − 1 is neglected. The same holds for huξ,v and the successor value v + 1 in (3.12b).
Constraint (3.12c) connects the decision variables xℓξ,v for the labeling with the auxiliary
variables hlξ,v and h
u
ξ,v: Exactly one of these three variables has to be set to 1—either v is
below the lower bound (hlξ,v = 1) or above the upper bound (h
u
ξ,v = 1), or the label ℓξ,v is
contained in the computed label set.
4. Experiments
We have implemented the described techniques in C++ using the MILP solver Gurobi [24].
The experiments were performed on an IntelR© Xeon R© CPU E5-2643 with 3.3 GHz clock
frequency and 32 GB of main memory, running Ubuntu 12.04 Linux in 64 bit mode. We
focus on the minimization of the number of commands needed to obtain a counterexample
and simplify them by deleting a maximum number of branchings and variable values. We
do not consider symmetries in the models. We ran our tool with two threads in parallel
and aborted any experiment which did not finish within 10 min (1200 CPU seconds). We
conducted a number of experiments with benchmarks that are publicly available on the web
page of PRISM [29]. We give a brief overview of the used models.
◮ coin-N -K [30] models the shared coin protocol as in Example 2.7. The protocol is pa-
rameterized by the number N of involved processes, which collectively undertake a random
walk by flipping an unbiased coin and, depending on the outcome, incrementing or decre-
menting a shared counter. If the counter reaches a value greater than KN for an integer
constant K > 1 then the decision is heads, if it is less than −KN then tails. We consider
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the property P≤λ
(
♦ (finished ∧ all coins equal 0)), which is satisfied if the probability to
finish the protocol with all coins equal to 0 is at most λ.
For N = K = 2, this probability is 0.5556. To show the applicability of our approach
we introduce a “bug” by having a biased coin where the probability for coin=0 is 0.8 for all
processes. The probability is now 0.9999. If we search for a smallest critical command set
for P with a probability bound of 0.5, which is the expected scenario, the command 2.4 as
in Example 2.7 is not chosen. That means to observe faulty behavior it is not necessary to
ever increment the counter. This gives us the hint that the fault is caused by the flipping
command 2.2.
◮ wlan-B-C models the two-way handshake mechanism of the IEEE 802.11 Wireless LAN
protocol. Two stations try to send data, but run into a collision. Therefore they enter the
randomized exponential backoff scheme. The parameter B denotes the maximal allowed
value of the backoff counter. We check the property P≤λ
(
♦ (num collisions = C)
)
putting
an upper bound on the probability that a maximal allowed number C of collisions occur.
◮ csma-N -C concerns the IEEE 802.3 CSMA/CD network protocol. N is the number of
processes that want to access a common channel, C is the maximal value of the backoff
counter. We check P≤λ(¬collision max backoff U delivered) expressing that the probability
that all stations successfully send their messages before a collision with maximal backoff
occurs is at most λ.
◮ fw-N models the Tree Identify Protocol of the IEEE 1394 High Performance Serial Bus
(called “FireWire”) [31]. It is a leader election protocol which is executed each time a node
enters or leaves the network. The parameter N denotes the delay of the wire as multiples of
10 ns. We check P≤λ(♦ leader elected), i. e., that the probability of finally electing a leader
is at most λ.
Some statistics of the models for different parameter values are shown in Table 1. The
columns contain the name of the model (“Name”), its number of states (“#states”), transi-
tions (“#trans”), modules (“#mod”), commands (“#comm”), branches of the commands
(“#upd”), variables (“#var”), and different variable values (“#val”), i. e.,
∑
ξ∈Var |dom(ξ)|.
The values in braces are the number of commands and command branches, respectively,
that are relevant for the considered property. Column “Pr+(sinit,♦T )” contains the reach-
ability probability and column “λ” the probability bound. The last column “MCS”shows
the number of states in the minimal critical subsystem, i. e., the smallest subsystem of the
PA such that the probability to reach a target state inside the subsystem is still above the
bound. Entries which are marked with a star correspond to the smallest critical subsystem
we could find within the time bound of 10 min using our tool LTLSubsys [10], but they are
not necessarily optimal.
The results of our experiments computing a smallest critical command set are displayed
in Table 2. The first column “Model” contains the name of the model. The following two
blocks contain the results of runs without any cuts (cf. Section 3.5) and with the best
combination of cuts: If there were cut combinations with which the MILP could be solved
within the time limit, we report the fastest one. If all combinations timed out, we report
the one that yielded the largest lower bound.
For the block without cuts, we give the number of variables (“Var.”) and constraints
(“Constr.”) of the MILP, the computation time in seconds (“Time”), the memory consump-
tion in MB (“Mem.”), the number of commands in the critical command set (“n”), and, in
case the time limit was exceeded, a lower bound on the size of the smallest critical command
set (“lb”), which the solver obtains by solving a linear programming relaxation of the MILP.
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Table 1: Model statistics
Model #states #trans #mod #comm #upd #var #val Pr+(sinit,♦T ) λ MCS
coin2-1 144 252 2 14 (12) 16 (12) 5 19 0.6 0.4 13
coin2-2 272 492 2 14 (12) 16 (12) 5 23 0.5556 0.4 25∗
coin2-4 528 972 2 14 (12) 16 (12) 5 31 0.52940 0.4 55∗
coin2-5 656 1212 2 14 (12) 16 (12) 5 35 0.52379 0.4 67∗
coin2-6 784 1452 2 14 (12) 16 (12) 5 39 0.51998 0.4 83∗
csma2-2 1038 1282 3 34 (34) 42 (42) 11 94 0.875 0.5 540
csma2-4 7958 10594 3 38 (38) 90 (90) 11 122 0.99902 0.5 1769∗
fw01 1743 2197 4 68 (64) 72 (68) 10 382 1.0 0.5 412
fw04 5452 7724 4 68 (64) 72 (68) 10 394 1.0 0.5 412∗
fw10 17190 29364 4 68 (64) 72 (68) 10 418 1.0 0.5 412∗
fw15 33425 63379 4 68 (64) 72 (68) 10 438 1.0 0.5 412∗
wlan0-2 6063 10619 3 70 (42) 100 (72) 13 91 0.18359 0.1 121
wlan0-5 14883 26138 3 70 (42) 100 (72) 13 94 0.00114 0.001 952∗
wlan2-1 28597 57331 3 76 (14) 114 (14) 13 100 1.0 0.5 7
wlan2-2 28598 57332 3 76 (42) 114 (72) 13 101 0.18260 0.1 121∗
wlan2-3 35197 70216 3 76 (42) 114 (78) 13 102 0.01793 0.01 514∗
wlan3-1 96419 204743 3 78 (14) 130 (14) 13 110 1.0 0.5 7
wlan3-2 96420 204744 3 78 (42) 130 (72) 13 111 0.18359 0.1 121∗
An entry “??” for the number of commands means that the solver was not able to find a
non-trivial critical command set within the time limit. For the best cut combination, the
last four columns specify the combination of cuts leading to the best running time. Here
the column “σf” corresponds to scheduler forward cuts (3.8), “σb” to scheduler backward
cuts (3.9), “ℓ” to label cuts (3.10), and “‖” to synchronization cuts (3.11). An entry “√”
indicates that the corresponding constraints have been added to the MILP, “×” that they
were not used.
Although we ran into timeouts for many instances, in particular without any cuts, in
almost all cases a solution could be found within the time limit. We suppose that also the
solutions of the aborted instances are optimal or close to optimal. It seems that the MILP
solver is able to quickly find good (or even optimal) solutions due to sophisticated heuristics,
but proving their optimality is hard. A solution is proven optimal as soon as the objective
value of the best solution and the lower bound coincide. The additional cuts strengthen this
lower bound considerably. Further experiments have shown that the scheduler forward cuts
of Eq.(3.8) have the strongest effect on the lower bound. Choosing good cuts consequently
enables the solver to obtain optimal solutions for more benchmarks.
Table 3 contains the results of the subsequent simplification steps: To the PRISM model
corresponding to the smallest critical command set we applied minimization of the com-
mands’ branches and finally to its result the minimization of variable domains. For both we
give, as before, the computation time in seconds, the memory consumption in megabytes,
the resulting number of branches and variable values, respectively, and, if a time out oc-
cured, the computed lower bound. For both simplification steps we report only the running
times obtained using the best combination of cuts. In all experiments that terminated
within the time limit, the branch and variable domain minimization were faster than the
previous command selection using the same combination of cuts.
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Table 2: Results for command minimization (TO = 600 seconds)
no cuts best cut combination
Model Var. Constr. Time Mem. n lb Time Mem. n lb σf σb ℓ ‖
coin2-1 277 492 TO 855 9 8 69.05 42 9 opt
√ √ √ ×
coin2-2 533 1004 TO 1140 9 6 TO 1111 9 8 × × √ √
coin2-4 1045 2028 TO 553 9 6 TO 974 9 7 × √ √ √
coin2-5 1301 2540 TO 768 9 5 TO 554 9 6 × √ √ √
coin2-6 1557 3052 TO 698 9 5 TO 688 9 6 × √ √ ×
csma2-2 2123 5990 7.30 26 32 opt 4.19 28 32 opt × × × √
csma2-4 15977 46882 196.11 215 36 opt 77.43 261 36 opt × √ √ √
fw01 3974 13121 TO 148 28 27 29.43 122 28 opt
√ × × ×
fw04 13144 43836 TO 604 28 22 103.37 296 28 opt
√ √ × √
fw10 46282 153764 TO 954 28 15 390.82 1102 28 opt
√ × × √
fw15 96222 318579 TO 1494 28 10 TO 1861 28 19
√ √ × ×
wlan0-2 7072 6602 TO 474 33 15 TO 373 33 31
√ √ √ √
wlan0-5 19012 25808 TO 1083 ?? ?? TO 1083 ?? ?? × × × ×
wlan2-1 28538 192 1.12 45 8 opt 0.82 45 8 opt
√ √ × ×
wlan2-2 29607 6602 TO 517 33 15 TO 416 33 31
√ √ × √
wlan2-3 36351 18922 TO 809 38 14 TO 394 38 32
√ √ × √
wlan3-1 96360 192 1.98 142 8 opt 1.98 142 8 opt × × × ×
wlan3-2 97429 6602 TO 552 33 15 TO 518 33 31
√ √ × √
Table 3: Results for branch and variable domain minimization (TO = 600 seconds)
branch minimization var. domain minimization
Model Time Mem. n lb Time Mem. n lb
coin2-1 3.78 16 11 opt 0.39 10 15 opt
coin2-2 TO 3293 11 opt TO 1142 19 17
coin2-4 TO 1548 11 9 TO 938 25 15
coin2-5 TO 814 11 9 TO 809 29 15
coin2-6 TO 1186 11 9 TO 515 32 13
csma2-2 0.46 15 39 opt 0.33 18 92 opt
csma2-4 TO 135 70 69 3.16 102 120 opt
fw01 0.11 11 27 opt 0.14 14 342 opt
fw04 0.31 26 30 opt 0.33 32 342 opt
fw10 0.81 58 29 opt 1.16 72 342 opt
fw15 1.37 88 27 opt 2.30 112 342 opt
wlan0-2 1.58 23 31 opt 0.96 241 50 opt
wlan2-1 0.11 30 8 opt 1.01 260 25 opt
wlan2-2 TO 1533 49 43 5.52 251 67 opt
wlan2-3 TO 332 37 32 TO 865 51 40
wlan3-1 0.47 91 8 opt 3.57 871 25 opt
wlan3-2 TO 1624 49 42 8.68 889 66 opt
We have also ran the two simplification steps directly on the original PRISM model with
all commands. There the computation times were comparable to those of determining a
smallest critical command set (cf. Table 2). Thus we suppose that the much smaller times
for simplification after selecting a smallest critical command set are due to the considerably
reduced possibilities for simplification.
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The experiments show that is feasible to use MILP formulations for counterexample
computation, although solving the MILPs is costly and often optimality of the result cannot
be proven by the solver within the given time limit. Additionally we can see that in all
cases we are able to reduce the number of commands and to simplify the commands, in
some cases considerably, compared to the original PRISM model.
5. Conclusion
We have presented a new type of counterexamples for probabilistic automata which are
described using a guarded command language: We computed a smallest subset of the
commands which alone induces an erroneous system. This requires the solution of a mixed
integer linear program whose size is linear in the size of the state space of the PA. State-
of-the-art MILP solvers apply sophisticated techniques to find small command sets quickly,
but they are often unable to prove the optimality of their solution.
For the MILP formulation of the smallest critical labeling problem we both need decision
variables for the labels and for the scheduler inducing the maximal reachability probabilities
of the subsystem. On the other hand, model checking can be executed without any decision
variables using a linear programming formulation. We therefore coupled a MAXSAT solver
with a model checker for PAs. For many benchmark instances this reduced the computation
time significantly. First results on this alternative method have been published in [32].
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Appendix
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 3.2
LetM = (S, sinit,Act, P ) be a PA, L : S×Act×Distr(S)×S 7→ 2Lab a labeling function and
w : Lab→ R≥0 a weight function. Assume the reachability property P≤λ(♦T ) is violated.
Theorem A.1. To decide whether there is a critical label set Lab′ ⊆ Lab with w(Lab′) ≤ k
is NP-complete.
Proof. That the decision problem is in NP is obvious: we can guess a label set Lab′ ⊆ Lab
and verify in polynomial time by computing the reachability probability Pr+(sinit,♦T ), that
w(Lab′) ≤ k and that Pr+(sinit,♦T ) > λ.
To prove the NP-hardness, we give a reduction from exact 3-cover (X3C) [22], similar
to [25]. X3C is defined as follows:
Let X be a finite set with |X| = 3r and a collection C ⊆ 2X of subsets with
|c| = 3 for all c ∈ C. Is there a collection of pairwise disjoint sets B ⊆ C
such that X =
⋃
c∈B c?
We note that X has an exact 3-cover iff it has a cover of size |B| ≤ r.
Given X and C, we construct a PA M = (S, sinit, {α}, P ) as follows: S = X ∪˙ C ∪˙
{sinit, t} with two fresh states sinit and t. We set P (sinit) =
{
(α, µX)
}
with µX(x) =
1
|X|
for all x ∈ X and µX(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S \X. For x ∈ X we define P (x) =
{
(α, µ1c)
∣∣ c ∈
C with x ∈ c}, where µ1c(c) = 1 and µ1c(s) = 0 for all s 6= c. Finally, P (c) = {(α, µ1t )} for
all c ∈ C, and P (t) = ∅.
We use the following label set Lab = {ℓsinit}∪{ℓx |x ∈ X}∪{lt} and label the branches
as follows: all branches in P (sinit) are labeled with ℓsinit, the branches in P (x) with ℓx for
x ∈ X and the branches in P (c) with ℓt for c ∈ C. The weight function w assigns 0 to ℓsinit
and ℓt, and 1 to all other labels. The set of target states is {t}, and the probability bound
λ = 1− 1|X|+1 .
We claim that there is a critical label set with weight ≤ r iff X has an exact 3-cover.
“⇒” Let Lab′ ⊆ Lab be a critical label set with w(Lab′) ≤ r. We can assume w. l. o. g. that
ℓsinit and ℓt are contained in Lab
′ since their weight is zero. We observe that from each
state x ∈ X there has to be a path to state t in the induced sub-PAM|Lab′ . Otherwise
the maximal probability to reach t from sinit is ≤ 1 − 1|X| < 1 − 1|X|+1 . This means,
for each x ∈ X there is c ∈ C with x ∈ c and ℓc ∈ Lab′. Let B = {c ∈ C | ℓc ∈ Lab′}.
B is a cover of X. Since w(Lab′) ≤ r, |B| ≤ r and B is an exact cover.
“⇐” Let B ⊆ C be an exact cover of X. We set Lab′ = {ℓc | c ∈ B} ∪ {ℓsinit, ℓt}. Then
w(Lab′) = r. For all x ∈ X there is c ∈ B such that x ∈ c, because B is a cover. That
means, for all x ∈ X there is a path from x to t with probability 1 in M|Lab′ . Since
ℓsinit ∈ Lab′, we have that Pr+(sinit,♦ {t}) = 1. Hence, Lab′ is critical.
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